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RESUMEN: El concepto de Democracia Fiscal, que aún no está completamente definido, tiene las 
cualidades básicas que pueden considerarse especialmente de acuerdo con las condiciones 
estructurales de los países. La democracia fiscal está tratando de determinar qué tan flexibles son los 
cuerpos ejecutivos elegidos. Como resultado de este índice, se debate hasta qué punto los países 
pueden responder a los deseos del público al mostrar cuánto pueden o no pueden actuar o tener 
espacio fiscal en el campo de las finanzas públicas. En cálculos anteriores de movimientos de los 
países, para hacer una distinción según el Balance del Gobierno General obligatorio y opcional, se 
calculó para Turquía el Índice de Democracia Fiscal que cubre el periodo 1950-2018.  
PALABRAS CLAVES: Democracia fiscal, presupuesto, democracia, espacio fiscal, competencia 
fiscal. 
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ABSTRACT: The concept of Fiscal Democracy, which is not yet fully defined, has the basic qualities 
that can be considered especially according to the structural conditions of the countries. The fiscal 
democracy is trying to determine how flexible the elected executive bodies are. As a result of this 
index, it is debated to the extent to which the countries can respond to the public's wishes by showing 
how much they are or are not able to act or have fiscal space in the public finance field. Earlier 
calculations of motion of the countries, the General Government Balance of mandatory and optional 
of making a distinction, Fiscal Democracy Index, covering the period 1950-2018 was calculated for 
Turkey.  
KEY WORDS: Fiscal democracy, budget, democracy, fiscal space, fiscal competition. 
INTRODUCTION. 
The budget, which has an important role in the development of democracy in the historical process, 
is one of the basic building blocks of the democratic process. In representative democracies, the 
budget right which is mostly applied nowadays is delegated by giving permission and authority to the 
government elected by the people. 
Considering the disadvantages of representative democracy in recent years, different budgeting 
approaches come to the fore. In recent years, especially in the understanding of budgeting, different 
understandings such as participatory budgeting, sexist budgeting, social budgeting, citizen-focused 
budgeting are put forward in part because of efforts to increase the degree of democratization. In 
addition, the concept of fiscal democracy was put forward as a different and inclusive indicator from 
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the aforementioned budget approaches.  
The concept of fiscal democracy, which has not yet been clearly defined, has the basic qualities that 
can be evaluated differently, especially when considered according to the specific structural 
conditions of the countries. The fiscal democracy, which proposes a dual distinction as the optional 
and compulsory expenditures in the parliament's vote by the parliament, tries to determine how 
flexible the elected executive bodies are. This flexibility is tried to be measured by Fiscal Democracy 
Index. As a result of this index, it is discussed how much mobility or fiscal space the countries have 
in the field of public finance. 
Before the concept of fiscal democracy, the relationship between budget and democracy will be 
discussed. Then, the historical and theoretical structure of the concept of fiscal democracy will be 
explained. In the third part of the study, the relationship between globalization and the tax competition 
which is one of the concepts it brings with fiscal democracy and its effects will be evaluated. In the 
fourth part of the study, the countries where the fiscal democracy index is calculated will be evaluated. 
In the last part will make suggestions about the fiscal results calculated by evaluating democracy 
index covers the years 1950-2018 for Turkey. 
DEVELOPMENT. 
The birth of democracy was the result of efforts to limit the taxing power of political authority. The 
limitation of the power of taxation is the essence of the legislative powers of parliaments. In the 
historical process, it is seen that the first struggle for democracy started as a reaction or attitude 
towards the arbitrary attitudes of the governments on taxation.  
Parliaments have received their first and most important powers of taxation. The rule that unofficial 
taxation cannot be accepted as one of the basic constitutional principles of western democracies 
(Cagan, 1980: 131). Both, the concepts of budgeting and democracy have been linked to each other 
in the historical process. The emergence of the need for budgeting stems from the desire to control 
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increasingly expanding and complex government spending, especially in countries that are on the 
road to liberalization and democratization. It is normal for a significant expansion of government 
activities to create some changes in the political process. This is a reflection of the desire of citizens 
who acquire or have political rights in the democratic process to control the expenditures and revenues 
of the government. Moreover, this situation is closely related to meeting the public goods and services 
needed by citizens (Singer, 1996: 20-21). 
Therefore, it can be said that the Parliaments gained their first powers as a result of the demand to 
control public finances. First of all, it is aimed to limit the excessive taxes and increased public 
expenditures imposed on the citizens of the non-democratic executive power with the control of the 
taxes and then the public expenditures of the parliaments formed by the public representatives. This 
first step on the path to democratization means the sharing of these powers with the elected executive 
body by limiting the powers of absolute power through Parliaments (Cagan, 2009: 183-184; Cagan, 
1985: 199).  
Budgets are implemented by all organizations, whether in the public or private sector, in terms of 
performance measurement, evaluation, and control, and are an important tool for rationalizing public 
finances. Moreover, the budget is more than a technical approach, it is a political process jointly 
carried out by the executive and the legislative body at the point of decision-making and allocation 
of resources for taxation and other resources. Therefore, it can be said that the separation of powers 
is historically shaped on the basis of budgeting (Singer, 1996: 21). 
Although the budget right is an important concept in the development and development of the 
democratic regime, the budget right is essentially the right of the citizens. In representative 
democracies, this essential right is used through authorized representatives. Therefore, the budgetary 
authority of the parliament, rather than the budget right, government power, and the authority of the 
budget can be mentioned (Cagan, 2009: 183-184). 
5 
 
Towards the end of the twentieth century, the development of information and communication 
technologies and the transition to the information society, the effectiveness, and democratization of 
representative democracies have begun to be questioned. Debates on the applicability of direct 
democracy for the control of public finances have been revealed within the framework of the fiscal 
transparency and accountability with citizens' right to information (Cagan, 2009: 183-184).  
In the context of these debates, it is important to explore the relationship between budgeting and 
society and the relationship between budgeting and democracy (Rubin, 1990: 187). In representative 
democracies, when the reasons that decrease the effect of the parliament in the budget process are 
examined, a large part of the law emerged in the previous periods and thus the commitments made 
for the permanent works. Hence, the majority of public expenditures are predetermined. In this case, 
the budgeting process turns into a mandatory ceremony that must be fulfilled (Cagan, 2009: 188; 
Cagan, 1985: 221). 
Such a strong interaction between the concepts of budget and democracy and the debates on the 
subject, especially in the point of democracy, form the basis of this study. 
Fiscal democracy. 
Since the late 1970s, the problem of political inheritance is an important theme in the public finance 
literature. In most democratic states, the ongoing budget deficits and the increase in public debt have 
left a negative political heritage to the governments of choice or elected. As a result of the borrowing 
which is applied as the financing of increasing deficits, factors such as interest burden and insufficient 
tax revenues are threatened by the democratic system in the following years (Streeck and Mertens, 
2010:5). In addition to the fiscal pressures, the selected governments are becoming increasingly 
confronted with new demands, and the extent of this problem is expanding from the fiscal to the 




In fact, although the concept of fiscal democracy is new in the literature, it is quite old in terms of 
content. This idea is closely related to the fact that the elected governments and parliaments are the 
heirs of the political legacies of the previous governments and parliaments. Negative political heritage 
narrows the capacity of elected governments and parliaments to respond to emerging social problems. 
Because it is difficult to eliminate the previously decided and implemented government spending 
programs, it is a mechanism that gradually increases the costs within the framework of the compound 
interest logic (Streeck and Mertens, 2010: 5). 
Although the concept of fiscal democracy was put forward by Eugene and Steurle, it was not clearly 
defined. Therefore, the meaning of fiscal democracy is more intuitive. Because a country's current 
priorities often have fiscal implications, democracy is essentially a fiscal issue. In the voting process, 
democratic control is possible with the capacity to make a difference in political conditions. If there 
is no alternative situation, the voting process is no longer meaningful and becomes unnecessary. 
Fiscal democracy does not only include formal preconditions (eg equal voting rights) but also 
includes conditions such as political preference and autonomy. In fact, fiscal democracy is the case 
when voters have the power to change the government and have the power to determine fiscal policies 
in the light of the electoral preferences of the elected governments (Genschel and Schwarz, 2012: 1; 
Genschel and Schwarz, 2013: 59; Steurle, 2016). 
At this point, the negative political legacies, which involve a large part of the tax revenues from the 
perspective of government and parliament, lead to the problem of fiscal democracy. Because 
government and parliaments have made decisions for many things in the past, there is very little left 
for decision-making today (Streeck and Mertens, 2010). This situation causes the flexibility and 
mobility of governments on the fiscal resources, in other words, the fiscal space, and the question of 




It is generally suggested that the problems faced by democratic governments are in the form of the 
budget deficit, fiscal sustainability, and budget consolidations. In fact, these deficits or fiscal 
imbalances are the symptoms of a larger problem that can be defined as the biggest and the most 
complete reduction of fiscal democracy These negative situations can be defined as the reduction of 
fiscal democracy in the widest and most comprehensive form (Steurle, 2012: 148; Steurle, 2014: 3). 
Under the main heading of fiscal democracy, these negatives (Steurle, 2012: 148-149) can be listed 
as follows: 
Long-term sustainability: If the policies of today do not change, the shortcomings become 
unsustainable in the long term and threaten the economy. 
Counter-cyclical policy: It threatens the mobility or fiscal ability of governments against possible 
counter-cycle period. 
Fiscal sclerosis: To allocate the resources of the future on the basis of today, rather than tomorrow, 
creates inefficiency. Because, at present, budgets tend to be increasingly dependent on consumption 
expenditures. The budgets focusing on more consumption reduce the fiscal area and cause fiscal 
hardening by threatening or reducing the expenditures in important areas such as education or 
investment. 
Social welfare policies that are insufficient in terms of inclusive growth: When sustainability and 
fiscal sclerosis issues are set aside, systems for social welfare are increasingly unfair, inefficient and 
regressive. 
These negativities also reveal three political dilemmas (Steurle, 2012: 149): 
Fiscal democracy: Under current circumstances, the law restricts today's governments under the 
heading of compulsory expenditure schemes, according to the rules and rules applied by yesterday's 
legislators. The shrinking movement of governments, which are elected by the voters of today and 
tomorrow, has a negative impact on fiscal democracy. 
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Classic prisoners’ dilemma: Regardless of what political views, governments are facing cuts in 
spending or an increase in taxes to reduce deficits and ensure sustainability. When governments make 
an assessment in the election or vote perspective, they remain within the classical prisoner gap, having 
to face the risk of losing their current positions on the one hand, on the one hand with this spending 
cut or tax increases. 
The difficulty of fixing the government: It is quite difficult to apply all expectations at the same time 
in the decisions of the governments chosen for the purpose of a major program to be used mainly for 
correction or to restrict discretionary actions. One government can focus on educational spending, 
while another can focus on tax cuts. This makes it difficult to put selected governments into a fixed 
pattern. 
In fact, these problems are concerned not only with the sustainability of deficits or public debts but 
also with the increasing pressure of today's politicians to control future budgets. There is pressure on 
both sides when looking at the budget in terms of expenditure and income; for example, on the one 
hand, the pressures on the income side, such as tax cuts that are constantly on the agenda along with 
the increasing pressure of welfare policies and wages, have a negative impact on fiscal democracy 
and create a dangerous position for the sustainability of budgets (Steurle, 2014: 25). 
At this point, it should be noted that fiscal sustainability is a fundamental issue in public finance and 
macroeconomic area for emerging economies. In most crisis periods, the burden of public debt service 
burden and the tendency of excessive spending tend to create negative situations in the face of 
negative shocks. Spending programs for the unemployed and the poor are problematic over time with 
the public spending programs that are aggressively implemented by developing economies to respond 
to social demands. These spending programs increase the public debt burden and make countries 
vulnerable to crises. Finally, the increase in compulsory expenditures may negatively affect the 
quality of the country's competitiveness, capital accumulation, and fiscal consolidation by excluding 
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investment expenditures. For all these reasons, the budget composition should remain flexible in order 
to meet the fiscal targets set in the medium-term budget framework and to adapt to potential shocks 
(Echeverry et al. 2005: 1-2; IMF, 2013: 29; Cebi, 2015: 4). Thus, the index of fiscal democracy will 
increase and the increase of this index will provide positive contributions both to meet the demands 
of the citizens and to ensure a sustainable fiscal structure. 
In addition, allocation of resources in democratic systems should reflect the preferences and priorities 
of the society. These priorities and preferences should be considered by democratically elected 
deputies. However, it should not be forgotten that these demands are not always sufficient to provide 
budgetary flexibility and sometimes cause the budget to solidify (Echeverry et al. 2005: 13). 
From a fiscal rule perspective to fiscal democracy, the budgetary rules and debt limits accepted in the 
field of public finance at the macro level are in fact closely related to fiscal democracy. Because the 
debt principal and interest payments from the previous periods to reduce the fiscal democracy. This 
situation is not only focused on the national scale, but also on regional or international agreements as 
in the case of the European Union (Streeck, 2015: 25). 
Fiscal democracy is also closely related to the efficiency of government spending. Increasing 
efficiency in government expenditures requires the reduction of the rigidities in budgetary 
management, that is, the compulsory expenditures. If budget management is not sufficient and 
effective in this regard, the targets may not be achieved in order to ensure that the expenditures are 
efficient (Mattina and Gunnarsson, 2007). In addition, the increase in the compulsory expenditures 
within the budget makes it difficult for both budgetary and fiscal policies to respond to possible 
shocks. At the same time, it may disrupt the fiscal discipline in line with the continuous increase in 
the required expenditures in expenditure items. At this point, increasing the flexibility of the budget 
increases the quality of fiscal policy and gives policymakers the opportunity to act (Cebi, 2015: 4; 
Dag, 2017: 129). 
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Fiscal Democracy and Tax Competition. 
In the historical process, as the world economy is increasingly dependent on each other, the adaptation 
of national tax systems to international conditions becomes a necessity rather than a need. This 
inevitable necessity implies creating a system by taking into account international mobility while not 
interfering with the competitiveness of the national industry.  
In almost all OECD countries, the share of public sector in national income is at a significant level 
compared to developing countries. Per capita income growth forces governments to make significant 
expenditures in welfare policies such as health, education, unemployment, and social services. These 
responsibilities put the countries under considerable burden with the defense and infrastructure 
expenditures existing in all countries (Boadway, 2005: 910-911; Sorensen, 1994: 57-58; Nielsen and 
Sorensen, 1997: 312). 
For this reason, political decision makers who design the tax policy face three different pressures 
closely linked to each other. These pressure factors; globalization, the internal dynamics of countries 
and budgetary constraints. Globalization is about racing towards the bottom which limits the capacity 
to increase tax revenues. Economic problems stemming from internal dynamics are forcing tax cuts 
on capital and labor, which are competing in the global arena. In addition, budgetary constraints, and 
especially the public sector's debt stock, narrow down the field of action by introducing serious 
difficulties in regulating tax policies (Oz, 2006: 72). Countries apply tax competition under these 
constraints and pressure factors. 
Tax competition, in its most general definition, is to partially or completely abandon the rights of 
countries to tax their economic activities in order to increase their competitiveness on a national scale 
and to attract foreign capital to the national economy. In a broader context, it refers to the impact of 
countries' tax policies on other countries. Finally, tax competition is a policy tool that makes the 
country economically attractive by reducing the effective tax rates and thus increasing the national 
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welfare (Yurdadog and Albayrak, 2017: 122-123). 
Fiscal democracy is under pressure not only by spending but also by income. At this point, worries 
about income are closely related to international tax competition. According to Genschel and 
Schwarz's studies in 2012 and 2013, the political economy literature is divided into two categories: 
whether such a competition will strike fiscal democracy. Some researchers argue that tax competition 
undermines the national tax autonomy by harming the fiscal democracy, while others argue that tax 
competition does not restrict the national tax autonomy, and therefore, does no harm to fiscal 
democracy (Genschel and Schwarz, 2012: 1-2; Genschel and Schwarz, 2013: 60). 
There are many comments on the theory of tax competition, but three main trends about his reality 
can be summarized as follows (Genschel and Schwarz, 2013: 62-63): 
Race to the bottom: Countries provide tax cuts to provide a competitive advantage, while they are 
also experiencing. 
Asymmetry: Small countries tend to increase tax revenues and reduce tax rates and revenues of large 
countries. 
Redistribution: While the mobile tax base moves from major countries to small countries 
(international redistribution), the national tax burden shifts from the mobile base to the non-mobile 
tax base at the same time (domestic redistribution). 
Firstly, tax competition has a negative impact on national tax autonomy. All the competing countries 
are constrained by the capital, whether large or small, which is mobile. National governments are also 
taxing non-mobile labor and consumption more and more in order to cover the compulsory 
expenditure. Therefore, the tax burden shifts from capital to labor and the benefit of individuals is 
decreasing due to decreasing public expenditures; for these reasons, tax competition adversely affects 
the income distribution between the two groups of society. Secondly, tax competition positively 
affects fiscal democracy in countries called small or peripheral countries.  
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Countries such as Ireland or Luxembourg have benefited both in terms of direct tax revenues and 
indirectly in terms of additional employment. In general, it can be said that the effects of tax 
competition on fiscal democracy are uncertain. Even though tax competition is said to affect fiscal 
democracy positively in small, poor or environmental countries, fiscal democracy is adversely 
affected in large countries (Genschel and Schwarz, 2013: 77-78). 
Fiscal Democracy Index and country examples. 
Steurle specifically focused on the political obligations and constraints that affect the preferences of 
yesterday's legislators, which affect the fiscal preferences of today's government or parliament. In 
order to measure these constraints and obligations, they developed the fiscal democracy index, which 
means the percentage of the remaining public revenues in the budget after deducting the obligatory 
public expenditures (including public debt interest). One way to measure how much the public 
financial balances of countries have changed is the so-called “financial Democracy Index” (Steurle, 
2010: 1; Steurle, 2016). When the literature on the financial democracy index is examined, it is 
observed that the financial democracy index is calculated for the United States, Germany, and the 
Czech Republic. 
According to Steurle 2012, the calculation of the fiscal democracy index; is expressed as a percentage 
of remaining public revenues within the budget after collecting the compulsory expenditures and 
public debt rates. The fiscal Democracy Index has been a downward trend in the US since the 1970s. 
Especially in the financial crisis period in 2009, the index fell below zero. During this period, 
compulsory expenditures including interest payments exceeded total government revenues and 






In Germany, since the 1970s, the Fiscal Democracy Index has been declining even more than in the 
United States. In particular, the unemployment benefit payments, the social security system and the 
increasing level of social benefits have steadily narrowed the German government’s political 
preference. However, the low interest rates since the 1990s made a positive contribution to the index 
by decreasing the cost of the debt service. However, the decrease in defense spending in the following 
years, especially after the end of the Cold War period, is another positive effect. However, at the end 
of the 1990s, the index continued to fall towards the beginning of the 2000s (Streeck and Mertens, 
2010: 10-11). 
In addition to the United States and Germany, the Fiscal Democracy Index for the Czech Republic 
for the years 1995-2009 has been calculated. According to the results obtained from 1995 to 2009, it 
is concluded that the index has lost almost half of its value. This decrease in the index is explained as 
a significant increase in social expenditures in the long term and the increase in the budget of the 
European Union and the increase in interest payments (Rozensky, 2012: 45-55). 
The Fiscal Democracy Index is conservative or, to a lesser extent, neutral in the face of the liberal 
political economy debate over the size of the state or government. Contrary to current budget laws, 
both tax cuts and increases in compulsory expenditures reduce the budget's flexibility and further 
increase control over past budget decisions (Steurle, 2012: 150). 
In general, Germany, the US, and the Czech Republic had a significant reduction in the financial 
democracy index since the 1970s. Indeed, it is observed that these countries have almost lost all their 
fiscal space in the face of any unexpected economic problems, such as mobility or flexibility against 
a possible future crisis. 
Calculation of Financial Democracy Index for Turkey. 
In this section, the calculation, evaluation, and results of the Fiscal Democracy Index for Turkey will 
be given. The index calculated for Turkey used the general government balance data for 1950-2018. 
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As it is known, Turkey's general state balance includes Government Budget, Social Security 
Institutions, Regulatory and Supervisory Institutions, and Local Administrations. Thus, taking into 
account the general state balance, which includes other administrations and institutions, rather than 
focusing solely on the central government budget, the calculation will ensure that the Fiscal 
Democracy Index is both more comprehensive and healthier. According to the economic 
classification, the general government balance is composed of current expenditures, investment 
expenditures and transfer payments in the most general form. 
Current expenditures are expenditures made for goods and services which are not allocated capital 
goods and which are exhausted by using them in the current year and which do not show any 
continuity of benefits but are repeated each year. For example, current expenditures, salaries, and 
wages paid to public employees, the functioning of public institutions are related to the provision and 
maintenance of administrative services (electricity, water, stationery) and related expenditures 
(Edizdogan et al. 2015: 88; Mutluer, 2010: 119). 
Investment expenditures are expenditures related to infrastructure investments and machinery-
equipment purchases that show the benefits of continuity, provide capital accumulation and increase 
production capacity (Edizdogan et al. 2015: 88-89; Mutluer et al., 2010: 119-120). 
Transfer payments are transferred to persons who do not cause an increase in national income or 
transfers to a certain part of the society for economic, fiscal or social reasons. The most important 
transfer payments in the general budget balance are interest payments. In addition to interest 
payments, there are sub-items such as participation in institutions, economic transfers, and assistance, 
fiscal transfers, social transfers, other debt payments, fund payments, expropriation and others 





In the light of the applied studies on the USA, Germany and the Czech Republic, two different indices 
are calculated by subjecting these expenditure items to a dual separation. These are called “Fiscal 
Democracy Index” and “Flexible Fiscal Democracy Index”. In the Fiscal Democracy Index, all 
current expenditures and transfer payments are considered compulsory expenditures, while 
investment expenditures are assumed to be optional expenditures. In addition, while interest payments 
are considered as compulsory expenditure on transfer payments, capital transfers are accepted as 
optional expenditures. In other calculations called the Flexible Fiscal Democracy Index, the 
calculation was made assuming a general evaluation of the share of 10% change in the compulsory 
expenditures accepted in the first index. The results of these calculations are shown in Figure 1 below: 
Figure 1: Fiscal Democracy Index in Turkey. 
 
Reference: The data obtained from the General Directorate of Budget and Fiscal Control (BUMKO) 
database were calculated by us. http://www.bumko.gov.tr/TR,157/butce-buyuklukleri-ve-butce 
gerceklesmeleri.html (27.11.2018). 
In Figure 1, the red line shows the Flexible Fiscal Democracy Index and the blue line also shows 
Fiscal Democracy Index. Figure 1 shows the results of the Fiscal Democracy Index calculations based 
on the years 1950-2018 for Turkey. According to Figure 1, the index, which was seen as negative in 
1950, gained an upward acceleration in 1960 and observed significant improvements. However, with 
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the military coup in 1960, the index lost almost half of its value. Since the mid-1970s, the index has 
recovered again in the years that followed. This recovery was also interrupted by a military coup and, 
with the impact of the 1994, 1998 and 2001 crises since then, the index fell below the 1950 level and 
destroyed all the gains provided.  
Turkey, whose fiscal system has been bankrupt, has again achieved an upward acceleration with the 
reforms and programs it has implemented since 2002. Unfortunately, although this is a process of 
recovery, it is observed in Figure 1 that the global crisis that erupted in 2008-2009 affects Turkey as 
well. The Fiscal Democracy Index of Turkey in the process that followed the global crisis has 
provided a partial improvement, but it is still far below the high rates that were caught in the previous 
periods. In order to understand this situation, it would be meaningful to look at Figure 2. 
Figure 2: The Ratio of Mandatory and Flexible Expenditures to Total Expenditures. 
 
Reference: The data obtained from the General Directorate of Budget and Fiscal Control (BUMKO) 
database were calculated by us. http://www.bumko.gov.tr/TR,157/butce-buyuklukleri-ve-butce 
gerceklesmeleri.html (27.11.2018). 
The course of compulsory and optional spending that took place in Turkey is presented in Figure 2. 
The red line shows flexible expenditures to total expenditures ratio and the blue line also shows 
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mandatory expenditures to total expenditures ratio in Figure 2. According to Figure 2, the share of 
investment expenditures of discretionary expenditures in the total expenditures of Turkey, especially 
after 2000, is very low. As a matter of fact, it was mentioned above that the Fiscal Democracy Index 
in recent years is far from its level in the best years. As a supporter of this argument, the current 
expenditures and transfer payments classified in the compulsory expenditure category are indicators 
that are on a fixed level after a certain period of time in investment expenditures. 
Although it is known that successful performance was achieved at the budget point in the post-2002 
period in Turkey, this success was not reflected in the fiscal democracy. Especially with the influence 
of expansionary policies prevailing around the world during this period, the state has also gained the 
largest privatization revenue in the history of the Republic. Although it is stated that the budget is 
apparently successful, the deterioration of public financial balances and macroeconomic indicators 
will increase the cost of borrowing costs as the shrinking policies dominate the world now. Therefore, 
it is estimated that the Fiscal Democracy Index will deteriorate in the future and will cause significant 
problems in public finance. Because in the following periods, the savings opportunities provided by 
the decrease in interest payments in the previous periods is now narrowed and the mandatory 
expenditures outside interest payments are at very high levels, increasing the accuracy level of these 
estimates. 
As a matter of fact, the report published by the IMF on Turkey pointed out that the increase in the 
non-interest expenditure tendency in the post-2000 period pointed to new budget contributions. 
Although low interest costs give budget flexibility, it is emphasized that salaries paid to personnel 
and transfers to social security institutions contributed greatly to the solidification of these spending 
categories in the short term (IMF, 2013: 30-31). Furthermore, it is underlined that spending limits 
remain only indicative in Turkey, and that spending limits remain only indicative in Turkey. Because 
there are deviations from the spending ceilings determined every year in Turkey and therefore 
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revisions are to be made. This is a weakness that prevents the medium-term program from being 
reliable in Turkey, where the accountancy mechanism is lacking. In addition, such a budget 
application erodes fiscal discipline and increases spending attendance by creating the expectation that 
higher levels of public spending will occur (IMF, 2013: 41-42). 
However, there is a point that should not be ignored. The index of financial democracy in Turkey in 
the face of the previously calculated index of Fiscal democracy in the United States and Germany is 
positive. Because, given the calculations made in these countries, Turkey and these countries have 
the same points in the current situation. Although Turkey is a developing country, the Fiscal 
Democracy Index which is calculated for Turkey is positive when it is taken as reference value 
because these countries are the world's leading developed countries. However, for the United States 
to see the negative levels of the index again in the projection made by Steuerle in the following 
periods, it is similar to that of Turkey in the foreseeable future. 
CONCLUSIONS. 
The concept of Fiscal Democracy, which allows national budgets and democracies to be viewed from 
a different and new perspective, should be emphasized. Existing governments remain under the 
influence of decisions taken by previous governments and therefore have to make decisions under 
certain constraints on the use of the budget. Elected governments through democratic elections need 
a flexible budget composition in order to respond to the democratic demands of the people. For this 
reason, the Fiscal Democracy Index, which is the criterion of the concept of Fiscal Democracy, 
measures the movement of countries or their flexibility and also the degree of democratization. 
Since Fiscal Democracy is closely related to taxation, its relationship with tax competition and its 
results are important. There are different opinions on the effects of tax competition in the literature.  
In this study, it is concluded that the effects of tax competition are not exactly certain. However, it 
should be noted that tax competition has exacerbated fiscal democracy in most countries while 
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broadening the scope of fiscal democracy in countries that can characterize it as small or peripheral. 
In the literature, the financial Democracy Index was calculated for the United States, Germany, and 
the Czech Republic. According to these calculations, the Fiscal Democracy Index declined sharply in 
these countries. The low Fiscal Democracy Index means that these countries do not have the fiscal 
space to provide flexibility to governments during any crisis, disaster or cyclical fluctuations, and 
they are not in a sustainable fiscal structure. 
In this study, the financial Democracy Index for Turkey covering the years 1950-2018 was calculated 
in terms of contribution to the literature. According to the index results, a fluctuating trend is 
observed. The reasons for these fluctuations have been interpreted with the help of the index, which 
is the military coups, political crises and economic and financial crises experienced in Turkey. In 
recent years, especially after 2002, more emphasis has been placed on the period. In the mentioned 
period, it was concluded that although Turkey's budget performance was quite successful, similar 
success in terms of fiscal democracy could not be achieved.  
Considering the privatization revenues, low borrowing costs and expansionary policies in the world, 
especially in the aftermath of 2002, it has been concluded that this period is now behind and that 
Turkey's budget performance and Fiscal Democracy Index will be adversely affected in the future. 
However, the deterioration in fiscal balances that contractionary policies in recent macroeconomic 
indicators and trends that started to spread around the world will have negative consequences for 
Turkey. 
At this point, it is important that the Fiscal Democracy Index be included in Medium Term Programs 
in public finance indicators. Because the governments elected by the people's votes should have a 
flexible budget structure in order to meet the demands of the citizens who choose them. This is a 




Current expenditures and transfer payments, which have a large share in the budget, should be placed 
on the basis of efficiency. In particular, public recruitment should be reduced to a minimum in order 
to stop the increase in salaries and wages of staff, which is a heavy burden on the budget and also to 
encourage private sector work. In case of transfer payments, the budget deficits that cause the increase 
of interest payments with the highest weight should be avoided and borrowing application should be 
started only for the investments that are accepted as the golden rule in the borrowing. In addition, in 
case of compliance with the spending ceilings specified in Medium-Term Programs as recommended 
by the IMF and failure to comply with these ceilings, the necessary correction or enforcement 
mechanisms are important in terms of Fiscal Democracy and Public Finance. 
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